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Doing it for themselves:  
The Steel Company of Wales and the study of American Industrial Productivity, 1945-1955 
 
In September 1947, Quincy Bent, vice president of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
Pennsylvania, received a letter from Guest, Keen and Baldwins Iron and Steel Company, one 
of four collaborating firms involved in building a new steel works at Port Talbot, on the 
south Wales coast. It sought permission for their melting shop superintendent, Bill Evans, to 
visit Bethlehem’s Sparrows Point works that Autumn. Its author, Fred Cartwright, described 
Sparrows Point as, “the finest melting shop in the world, and a target to aim at in 
performance and efficiency… I do hope”, he continued, that “when we finish building the 
works at Port Talbot we will at least having something in Great Britain which is worthwhile 
an American visiting us to see … do not believe that Britain is done for yet.”1  
The idea of superior American industrial productivity was becoming something of a 
national obsession in Britain by the 1940s. Comparative data on industrial performance in 
Britain, Germany and America, published in 1943, revealed that in iron and steel products, 
output levels were four times greater in the US than in Britain.2  In the context of Britain’s 
post-1945 economy, this was especially significant.  After the war, Britain’s acute balance of 
payments deficit, coupled with the decline in exports of its coal and textiles, intensified the 
importance of the steel-consuming industries of motor vehicle production and engineering 
as drivers of economic recovery.3 Growing perceptions of a significant productivity gap 
fuelled knowledge exchange initiatives designed to enlighten British industry. The ensuing 
work of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity [AACP], which sent sixty-six teams 
representing different British industries to the United States in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, helped spread awareness of some of the key features of American industrial practice, 
including mass production, systematic management, rationalization and competition.4 As 
the body formally charged with gathering and disseminating information about American 
productivity, the activities of the AACP have been well documented by British historians.5 By 
comparison, studies of company-led productivity investigations by British industrial firms in 
the immediate post-war period have been sparse..6 While the AACP’s reports were heralded 
by contemporaries as bringing, “a stimulus to improvement in individual firms”,7 the firms 
themselves, by implication, appear more as passive recipients of knowledge than active 
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participants in the process of investigating American industrial practice. Few steel company 
studies exist for the post-war period to suggest that there was much active study of 
American industrial performance beyond the remit of the AACP’s iron and steel industry 
productivity team.8 If anything, studies of Britain’s steel industry history in the post-war 
period have served to reinforce the picture of passivity, depicting an industry enjoying full 
employment and buoyant market demand, but characterised by complacency and riven 
with managerial conservatism.9 
This study presents a different view by examining the process of international 
knowledge gathering in one steel firm where regular transatlantic information-gathering 
visits were being undertaken by managers responsible for modernization and expansion 
planning. There was nothing unique in this: in steel firms across Europe there were 
examples of managers and directors who were proactive in undertaking their own 
investigations of American industrial productivity.10 The significant thing about this case 
study of the Steel Company of Wales (SCOW), is not so much that the company was 
engaged in US productivity studies of its own , but that it was doing so in a way that was 
different from the approach adopted by the AACP. In method, extent and focus, SCOW’s 
experience of US knowledge gathering was more personal, more in-depth and more 
bespoke. Moreover, its investigations of American industry to some extent preceded, and 
informed, the work of the AACP iron and steel productivity team. Far from waiting for 
productivity information to percolate down from official reports, the Steel Company of 
Wales became, in its own right, a disseminator of knowledge about the American steel 
industry, suggesting the need for a reassessment of the idea of key productivity messages in 
the industry radiating from centre to periphery.  
SCOW has been identified as one of the “most dynamic companies” in the post-war 
British steel industry, staffed by “a new generation of professional managers”,11 yet its 
efforts to learn about American steel industry practice in the 1950s have not been widely 
explored. There are a number of reasons for this. Histories of Britain’s steel industry in the 
post-1945 years have been dominated by the industry’s relationship with the state and the 
impact of nationalization, de-nationalization and re-nationalization in the 1950s and 
1960s.12 The role of the central institutions and control boards established to plan the 
industry after the war, though important, provide few insights into the US connections 
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developed by firms and managers at the forefront of the steel modernization process in the 
post-war years.13 Historians’ attempts to explore SCOW’s activities have also been 
hampered by a lack of access to its business records with the result that voices like that that 
of Fred Cartwright at Port Talbot have been barely audible. Using a previously un-
researched body of archival records documenting SCOW’s post-war business history,14 this 
study reveals an intense and ongoing commitment by the company to the study of US steel 
industry culture. A steady stream of information on US production methods filtered through 
to SCOW’s management almost continuously in the first decade after the war, providing the 
company with insights that were more detailed and tailored to their own needs than those 
gleaned by the AACP study teams. Yet despite this, SCOW’s responses to its own findings on 
US productivity were cautious and selective. Not surprisingly, for a firm created to build a 
new steel works, the question of how to modernize plant and processes dominated its early 
enquiries. This emphasis began to shift by the mid-1950s to a more critical review of labour 
productivity, but it was not until the 1960s that voices in the company advocating greater 
scrutiny of management practices and work study were fully heeded and an extensive 
manpower review commissioned. This change of pace and focus at SCOW in the 1960s was 
part of a wider intensification of productivity debates in Britain in that decade.15 It goes 
some way to explaining the dearth of attention to company initiatives in the 1950s but it 
should not overshadow the prolonged efforts to gather knowledge from the US in the first 
post-war decade. Then, an output-oriented focus on installing new plant and equipment 
was favoured, not only by the technocrats at SCOW, responsible for building and equipping 
Britain’s first new steelworks of the post-war era, but also for the financially-minded 
chairman and directors, for whom ideas of culture change to labour and management 
practices seemed unnecessarily radical and risky.  
Attempts by British steel firms to learn lessons from the industry in America did not 
begin after 1945. In the inter-war period a number of firms were investigating the 
acquisition of American wide strip mill technology.16  The hot rolling of wide strip steel was a 
revolutionary process pioneered in the US in the 1920s in response to growing demand in 
the motor industry for high quality sheet steel. By 1940 there were 28 wide strip mills 
operating in America.17 The firm of John Summers and Sons of Shotton, then the largest of 
Britain’s sheet steel producers, had sent representatives to the United States in the late 
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1920s to investigate strip mill technology, before eventually placing an order with the Mesta 
Machine Company of Pennsylvania in 1937.18 At Richard Thomas and Co., meanwhile, 
investigations into the new American strip mill process had been ongoing since the late 
1920s, before an order was placed with ARMCO for a wide strip mill to be installed at Ebbw 
Vale in 1938.19 Plans to install an American wide strip mill at Port Talbot also pre-dated the 
war. Led by its chairman, Sir Charles Wright, and later its managing director, J. S. Hollings, 
Guest Keen and Baldwins had enlisted the help of American engineers with the designs as 
early as March 1938.20  The outbreak of war disrupted momentum but, even before its end, 
the announcement of Board of Trade proposals for the merger of four Welsh steel firms to 
facilitate the construction of a new works at Port Talbot, re-instigated the process and, two 
years later, the Steel Company of Wales was born. 21 In America the steel industry had been 
re-shaped by a series of amalgamations in the early twentieth century, with the United 
States Steel Corporation and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation emerging as the two biggest 
players,22 but in Britain the SCOW experience was not typical. Although there had been 
some steel company mergers in the inter-war years, in recognition of the fact that adoption 
of new, mass production techniques, especially in sheet steel, was not economically viable 
by a multiplicity of small firms, the scale of re-organisation in south Wales was unusual. 
Elsewhere, dominant family interests hindered restructuring and uncertainty about the size 
of the market for new sheet products gave some firms the excuse they needed to avoid 
major reorganisation.23  
SCOW’s remit, however, was to build the £60 million Abbey steelworks at Port 
Talbot. This project was part of the five year modernization plan drawn up in 1945, at the 
government’s behest, by the British Iron and Steel Federation, which emphasised the urgent 
need for “new plant at the finishing end of the industry which would increase exports”.24  
Located on a 1,700 acre coastal site adjacent to the existing Margam steelworks of Guest, 
Keen and Baldwins, the Abbey Works was a vast industrial complex with a new strip mill, 
melting shop, and cold mill at its core. Alongside this, the re-building of the blast furnaces 
and melting shop at Margam and the extension of a wharf and transporter bridges at the 
local docks made for an ambitious and costly modernization scheme which had a 
transformative effect on the town of Port Talbot.25 The project was heralded by 
contemporaries as “Good news in a grim world”, and was seen by some as emblematic of 
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Britain’s post-war reconstruction.26 With a sizeable purse of Marshall Aid to draw on for the 
purchase of American plant and equipment, there were good reasons to see this as a 
decisive break with the past. One American observer predicted that it would be, “the great 
and efficient foundation for a much needed modernization and expansion of the steel 
industry of Great Britain.”27 
SCOW had a talented cohort of early- and mid-career managers who provided the 
kind of outward-looking, strategic perspective sometimes thought to have been lacking in 
the post-war British steel industry.28 In keeping with a growing trend in post-war British 
firms, some of the top positions in the new company were occupied by men with 
backgrounds in accountancy and finance.29 Ernest Lever, its first chairman, was an actuary 
who began his career with Prudential Assurance Company. By the time of his appointment 
at the Steel Company of Wales he had a proven track record as a steel industry modernizer, 
having already overseen the financial and organisational restructuring of Richard Thomas 
and Company.30  Julian Pode, its managing director, had begun his career in steel in 1926 at 
Dowlais Works, Merthyr, as an accountant, after a period in the Navy.31 Technically skilled 
men were also prominent among SCOW’s first wave of directors. Fred Cartwright, assistant 
managing director and general manager of SCOW’s steel division, eschewed university in 
favour of an engineering training with the Great Western Railway. Like Pode, his career in 
the steel industry had begun at Dowlais works during the inter-war depression, but he also 
spent several months at steel companies in the Ruhr in 1930 before returning to Wales to 
take up a position with Guest, Keen and Baldwins who were then building a new steelworks 
at East Moors in Cardiff.32 Sid Graeff, appointed director of rolling mills for SCOW in 1947, 
was an American engineer who had previously advised Richard Thomas and Company on 
the installation of their hot strip mill in Ebbw Vale in 1938.33 Below the level of directors 
there was also a crop of technically astute middle managers, including Gavin Smellie, works 
manager, recruited by Guest, Keen and Baldwin’s from the Beardmores steelworks in 
Lanarkshire in the mid-1930s,34 and Bill Evans, SCOW’s melting shop superintendent and 
later assistant general manager, who was an acknowledged authority on open hearth 
furnaces and “a very highly qualified metallurgist”.35 Another rising star was Campbell 
Adamson, who began his career in the South Wales steel industry as a management trainee 
with Richard Thomas and Baldwins before leading labour relations work for SCOW and then 
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overseeing construction of the new Spencer Works at Llanwern, Newport, in 1958 for 
Richard Thomas and Baldwins.36  
These men were among a dozen or so staff involved in a series of visits to the US 
organised by SCOW, beginning in 1945 and continuing into the late 1950s.37 The first two of 
these visits, by Fred Cartwright and Sid Graeff in 1945 and by Bill Evans in 1947, were 
undertaken as the Abbey Works was being planned and constructed, and brought back 
intelligence on the latest plant and design which fed directly into the building project. The 
eight week visit to America by Fred Cartwright and Sid Graeff in February 1945 “to 
investigate the manufacture of wide strip” 38 was, on the face of it, a continuation of the 
kinds of investigations British steel firms had been undertaking since the 1920s. On their 
return they wrote a report recommending an 80” fully continuous wide strip mill for the 
Abbey, to be supplied by the United Engineering and Foundry Company.39 In practice, 
however, the study of strip mill technology occupied much less attention in the early post-
war period than other aspects of the American industry. After all, British steel firms had 
been learning about US developments in the hot rolling of strip steel since the late 1920s 
and there had been little technical innovation in the US industry during the war.40 More 
important in raising US wartime production levels had been the huge steel construction 
program underway since the early 1940s and it was this, especially the evolution in 
steelworks design, that was the real revelation to the first wave of Welsh-based steelmakers 
who visited the US from 1945.  
The projected wartime increase in demand for steel in the US led to a growth in 
production capacity of some 15.4 million tons between 1938 and 1945.41 This was met by a 
program of expansion to existing works along with the construction of two brand new steel 
works: one at Fontana in California and the other at Geneva, Utah. Both featured long, low-
rise, flat-roofed mill buildings, spaciously arranged on newly developed sites, an aesthetic 
which had begun to develop in the US in the inter-war period as a response to the demands 
of the new, fast-moving, high volume production methods adopted by large manufacturers 
like the American sheet steel producers.42 Fred Cartwright and Sid Graeff gained only a 
partial insight into these developments in 1945 since their visit, albeit to more than a dozen 
steelworks and machine makers, was confined mainly to the American steelmaking 
heartlands of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and did not include the two newest steelworks in Utah 
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and California.43 Nevertheless it was sufficient to provide them with a vision of how the 
design of modern steelworks was evolving and a new blueprint for the construction of the 
Abbey Works.  
Following the visit, Cartwright shared his insights into the American steel industry in 
a lecture to the South Wales Institute of Engineers. In it he drew attention to the 
fundamental US shift in design, away from pitched roof mills to flat-profile “monitor” roof 
buildings. He enthused about the practical advantages of the new buildings: “Lighting is 
excellent. The windows are all vertical and extremely easy to clean and keep clean. Due to 
the insulation there is no condensation on the underside of the steel-decking. It is easy and 
safe to get at. The ventilation is even across the width. It lends itself to rigid joint 
construction.”44 The long, flat-roofed mills also facilitated the installation of specialist 
equipment such as overhead craneways, designed to aid the speedy movement of materials 
through the workspace. This emphasis on rapid throughput was a key part of the approach 
to factory design favoured by American industrial engineers since the early twentieth 
century.45 These new trends in steel mill design led to radical alteration of the original plans 
for the new Abbey strip mill and melting shop buildings which had been drawn up before 
the war. In the Winter of 1945 a new firm of consultant structural engineers, W.S. Atkins 
and Partners, with no prior experience of steelworks construction, was appointed by the 
Guest, Keen and Baldwins team and charged with delivering this new-look steelworks on the 
Abbey site. In William Atkins they had found a like-minded modernizer who disliked the 
traditional pre-1939 British factory buildings, with their typical pitched roofs and “sides 
covered with black corrugated bituminous coated sheeting.” 46   When provided with 
photographs of the recently constructed steel mills in the US with their innovative roof 
designs, Atkins saw the possibility of building something different at Port Talbot.  
The adoption of the American mill designs brought not only practical and aesthetic 
benefits but also provided an opportunity to reflect the modernity of the new steelworks in 
its external appearance. Characteristic of the new modernism which British architects were 
beginning to embrace in the post-war years were clean surfaces, the importance of light and 
the use of modern materials like plate glass and reinforced concrete.47 Sir Percy Thomas, the 
Cardiff-based president of the Royal Institute of British Architects, was consulted by SCOW 
on the Abbey designs, having had extensive experience of factory architecture thanks to his 
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work on the inter-war trading estate projects in Wales, and his regional work for the 
Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Production during the war.48 At the Abbey, he advised 
on the use of long vertical window panels to complement the glazed sections in the 
“monitor” roof, positioned to maximise natural lighting in the internal working spaces, and 
selected an external paint colour for the corrugated steel panels cladding the buildings to 
reflect the sand dunes surrounding the Abbey site.49 The result was an edifice strikingly 
different in appearance from other British steelworks. “A row of gigantic sand coloured 
buildings of modern design with massive curved windows dividing the building into 
segments”, was how one newspaper correspondent described the new strip mill. Another 
praised it as “a monument in glass, steel and concrete” with its “gracefully impressive 
walls”, a stark contrast to the adjacent old Port Talbot works which, “Like a tired old man … 
looks shabby alongside its gleaming son.”50   
As well as encouraging new trends in the external design features of steelworks, the 
adoption of wide strip mills for sheet steel production had knock-on effects for other 
aspects of steel-making, not least the open-hearth process, which had to deliver increased 
quantities of steel to feed the new high-volume strip process. As the first post-war British 
plant to be built from scratch around a new strip mill, the Abbey Works’ new melting shop 
had to be equipped to produce sufficient steel to keep the mills operating to the fullest 
possible capacity. It presented a significant design challenge for SCOW’s management and 
again they looked to the United States for guidance. The great construction drive in the US 
steel industry during the war saw open-hearth capacity increase from 72.9 million tons in 
1939 to 84.2 million tons in 1945.51 The open-hearth furnace was the dominant method of 
steel making in the US until the last third of the twentieth century and the process had 
undergone a succession of refinements to ensure that steel supply met the increasing 
demands of the strip mills.52 The result, as Cartwright observed after his 1945 US visit, was 
“a formidable difference between the best American practice and the best British.”53 The 
Steel Company of Wales’ team turned to one of the most experienced hands in the 
American industry, George Danforth, of the Open-Hearth Combustion Company, based in 
Chicago, to design the furnaces for its new melting shop planned for the Abbey works.  
Danforth was credited with major improvements in the open-hearth process and his 
company had been a key supplier to the US steel industry,54 but, aged 68 in 1947, he was 
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nearing the end of his career and could not be persuaded to make a site visit during the 
crucial Abbey melting shop construction phase.55 Danforth’s unavailability to give advice on 
site heightened the need for SCOW to mobilise home-grown expertise in the process of 
installing its new US equipment. It was a pattern of adapting and modifying imported 
American methods experienced in other British firms in the post-war era.56 SCOW 
responded by sending one of its own open-hearth specialists on a fact-finding mission to 
America, and by undertaking a programme of on-site operational research to inform the 
design process.57   
The visit of Bill Evans, SCOW’s melting shop superintendent, to examine the design 
and operation of the more modern American open hearth plants, was hastily arranged in 
the Autumn of 1947. It took in sixteen different plants and 22 melting shops, and covered a 
total of 19,401 miles.58 In Cartwright’s estimation, it amounted to an opportunity which 
“few steel men in Great Britain have ever had”.59 Armed with a detailed questionnaire 
covering all aspects of open-hearth operation and design, which he drew up before the visit, 
Evans became the key agent in channelling detailed information back to SCOW. He sent 
frequent letters to convey the most urgent construction information in answer to queries 
from Cartwright about such matters as brickwork design and flooring materials.60 He was 
also authorised to take with him to the US copies of plans for the layout of the Abbey Works 
melting shop which he shared and discussed with a number of American operators. At 
Homestead works in Pittsburgh, Evans reported that the plant superintendent and his 
assistants were “enthusiastic” about the plans and “were struck by the resemblance of our 
plant to theirs”, but they also commended novel features in the plan such as “our idea of 
building in blocks of four furnaces with spaces between each block.”61 Such exchanges 
suggest that, far from engaging in a one-way knowledge-gathering process, SCOW saw its 
US productivity visits, to at least some degree, as opportunities for reciprocal information 
exchange with their US counterparts. What they learned of US open-hearth steel production 
was further supplemented by the results of internal research activity. Back at Port Talbot, 
Cartwright and his staff organised trials and experiments designed to help them avoid 
congestion and delays in open-hearth production. A miniature working model of the entire 
Abbey melting shop was built so that the most efficient ways of conveying materials around 
the space could be worked out and different methods of charging tested.62 This elaborate 
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task, involved the modelling of every crane and piece of rolling stock so that the most 
efficient angles of movement could be calculated.63 It was, in effect, a pioneering piece of 
operational research aimed at ensuring rapid throughput of materials. It demonstrated the 
extent to which SCOW’s productivity focus was trained on the efficiency of its plant and 
systems in this period, and it presaged the establishment of an OR department at SCOW in 
the early 1950s, the early work of which was similarly focused on throughput efficiencies.64  
The knowledge of American steel-making that SCOW had amassed by the late 1940s 
placed the company in an authoritative position in relation to the AACP’s iron and steel 
industry productivity team which was then being assembled. Instead of participating in the 
AACP team visit to the US alongside representatives from many of Britain’s other major 
steel firms, 65 the company contributed to its activities in an advisory role, as a disseminator 
of knowledge of US steel production to the British industry team. Sir Charles Goodeve, 
director of the British Iron and Steel Research Association, 66 and the man tasked with 
leading the iron and steel team visit to the US in May 1951, contacted SCOW for advice on 
which US plants to visit. In return, Fred Cartwright passed on the most up-to-date 
information he possessed on the US steel industry, including a copy of the extensive visit 
report written by Bill Evans.67  Running to over 200 pages, it was possibly the most detailed 
written survey of the US steel industry in the immediate post-war period by any British 
observer. The AACP team also visited the Abbey Works shortly before its departure for the 
US, for “a pre-view of Britain’s newest and largest steelworks”.68 In terms of its own remit, 
however, the AACP Iron and Steel team adopted a focus very different to that of SCOW. 
Instead of investigating sheet steel, it focused its attention on the heavy rolled product 
sector.69 British firms involved in heavy plate production, in particular, were perceived to 
have been slow to modernize in the post-war years,70 suggesting that Goodeve’s team was 
directing its efforts where it felt the need was greatest. They also spent much less time 
examining steelworks design and layout than had Cartwright and his colleagues. By the time 
of their visit in 1951 the economic case for building new steelworks was being questioned 
and attention had turned more to achieving maximum productivity in the use of 
resources.71 The result was that its activities overlapped little with what SCOW had been 
doing, and did not lessen the incentive for the Welsh firm to continue pursuing its own 
programme of American steel industry scrutiny. 
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As Goodeve’s sixteen-member delegation completed its five week US trip, Fred 
Cartwright was in the advanced stages of planning a further  US visit of his own, later the 
same year, aimed at investigating developments in furnace design and new uses for sheet 
steel.72 The activities of formal industry productivity teams, however, did have implications 
for ongoing company initiatives like those of SCOW. Cartwright’s 1951 visit plans had to 
compete for space in a calendar crowded with official visit programs such as those of the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) technical assistance division, which began 
promoting productivity studies by western European countries in the United States.73 He 
acknowledged in his correspondence with United States Steel that, “you Americans must be 
fed up with the sight of Englishmen wishing to see your plants”74 and some of his closest 
contacts were slower than usual to respond to his letters. Charles Muchnic of the United 
Engineering and Foundry Company, wrote that, “We have had so many visitors from Europe 
who came here under the auspices of the ECA and the National Association of 
Manufacturers that I was kept very busy.”75  Greater demand led, in some quarters, to 
greater formalisation of access procedures and, despite Cartwright’s familiarity with most of 
the leading US companies and the readiness with which they had assisted with his requests 
for information in the past, he was warned in September 1951 to be sure of making 
“application for entrée to some of the steel plants you propose to visit, as frankly many of 
these plants are very sticky about permitting visitors.”76  
In the increasingly crowded world of 1950s industrial knowledge exchange activity, 
however, SCOW enjoyed some advantages over the members of the industry-wide teams 
visiting the US. Unlike the large, group tours undertaken by these parties, the visits by 
Cartwright, Evans and their colleagues, undertaken individually or in pairs, provided scope 
for a more personal level of interaction, including valuable one-to-one discussion time with 
operators, superintendents and company bosses. At Gary Works, Indiana, for example, 
Cartwright’s 1951 tour of the sheet and tin plant was followed by a private meeting with the 
company vice president, H. W. Johnson, and the use of the company president’s chauffeur 
to transport him around the different sites.77 In Utah, he was driven around by Walter 
Mathesius, the president of Geneva Steel and a director of the United States Steel 
Corporation. 78  In addition, his itinerary of plant visits was supplemented by a hectic social 
program of cocktail parties, country club lunches, theatre visits and dinners which cemented 
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friendships with some key American steel counterparts that went well beyond the 
professional.79 Crucial to this aspect of the visit was the fact that, unlike the sixteen-strong, 
all male productivity team led by Goodeve, Cartwright travelled to the US in 1951 
accompanied only by his wife, Sally. On informing his US contacts of this he found himself in 
receipt of dinner invitations and offers of hospitality, even before he had left Britain. C. B. 
Randall, president of Inland Steel Company wrote that, “if it can possibly be arranged, my 
wife and I shall insist on having you for dinner”, and K. C. Gardener of United Engineering 
and Foundry Company suggested that Sally Cartwright spend time with his wife while he 
visited the works.80 In post-war Britain, the degree to which managers’ wives entered the 
company worlds of their husbands extended little beyond attendance at the annual dinner 
dance, but in America a much greater level of visibility of corporate wives was expected.81 
Such social networking roles, described by scholars as “enabling” activities, were familiar 
territory to the American executive wife of the period, and undertaken in the belief that 
they helped the husband to reach his full potential in business.82 It was a relatively simple 
equation summed up by a respondent to one sociological study undertaken in the 1970s: “If 
a man wants you to go out to dinner and you haven’t got your wife, he has to leave his wife 
out. If your wife is there, his wife can come too. Often wives get to know each other and it’s 
good for them and good for business.”83  
The access gained by Welsh-based steel men into the business and social worlds of 
the American industry, enabled them to scrutinise at first hand the modern plant design and 
technologies employed by American steelmakers. Their knowledge-gathering efforts 
brought tangible rewards in terms of SCOW’s annual output which rose from 463,000 ingot 
tons in 1950 to 1,559,000 ingot tons in 1954. These kinds of gains prompted some self-
congratulatory rhetoric in the British steel industry in the mid-1950s. In 1956, for example, 
the AACP’s successor organisation, the British Productivity Council, produced a report which 
claimed that the productivity gains in iron and steel since the war were unmatched in any 
other manufacturing sector.84 But these figures were achieved in the context of a favourable 
sellers’ market and full employment and to some extent masked deeper problems which 
were exposed when the economic climate began to change. At SCOW’s Abbey Works, 
manning levels had increased over the same period from 4,863 to 11,051, 85 making it 
comparable in terms of workforce size with some of the biggest steelworks in the United 
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States. The trouble was that in terms of output per man, the gulf remained as wide as ever. 
In September 1954, output figures were received from the Inland Steel Company in Chicago 
which suggested that, for all of the reorganisation and capital investment, the Steel 
Company of Wales was not achieving anything like the same productivity levels as its 
American counterparts. Some 160 ingot tons per man year was produced at the Abbey 
Works compared to 260 at Inland, despite the fact that the Abbey Works was “much the 
more modern of the two”.86 This revelation prompted a new phase of investigation by 
SCOW into American industrial performance. On this occasion the knowledge-gathering 
responsibilities were entrusted to two managers. Gavin Smellie, who already had twenty 
years’ experience as a works manager in the Port Talbot steel industry, and his younger 
colleague Campbell Adamson, appointed personnel superintendent by SCOW in 1952,87 
travelled to the US in February 1955 for a three-month fact- finding visit, six weeks of which 
were spent at Inland. Their approach was characterised by a much more critical appraisal of 
performance than either SCOW’s own previous investigations, or those of the official 
productivity teams in the early to mid 1950s. Rather than focusing on technological or 
design issues, as their predecessors had done, they identified quality of management as the 
most significant factor affecting production per man. They produced a hard-hitting report 
into the failure of the British steel industry in this regard, in which they lamented that, “it is 
distressing with the number of Productivity Teams that have reported since the war, to find 
how comparatively little has been done to act on their recommendations … we have 
attempted to find excuses for any radical changes … and appear to have lulled ourselves into 
a false sense of security about our efficiency.”88 In particular, they highlighted two failings in 
British management as contributory factors to the enduring productivity gap: one was the 
lack of job evaluation as a means of exerting control over the labour force; the second was 
the growth of joint consultation between shop floor and management via works councils, 
which resulted in the erosion of the role of foremen in British steelworks.  
In the US, “scientific management” had evolved since the late nineteenth century, as 
an approach to the control of labour through the establishment of fixed time and output 
measures for specific jobs.89 In the American steel industry, an intensive programme of job 
evaluation was undertaken from 1944 to 1947 by a Co-operative Wages Board, which 
agreed work rates and wage levels across key roles in the industry. The iron and steel 
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productivity team’s report, produced for the AACP in 1952, noted the impact of job 
evaluation in the American steel industry but did not make any specific recommendations 
about its implementation in Britain.90 Likewise, Fred Cartwright, on his visit to the US in the 
Autumn of 1951, had informal discussions with the president of the Geneva Steel Company, 
Walter Mathesius, about job evaluation but did not attempt to introduce any similar 
schemes into the Abbey Works.91 Some of the more hard-edged management practices in 
the United States appeared unpalatable, both to Cartwright and to Bill Evans. At the 
Bethlehem Corporation’s Sparrows Point works in Maryland, for example, Evans noted that 
the staff were “worked harder than at any other plant I visited, and all appeared tired and 
ready to go at 5pm.”92 Its reputation for efficiency was based on the fact that the plant 
prided itself in its ability to extract maximum return out of its men and machinery.93 It was 
not a working culture that the Steel Company of Wales wanted to emulate and Cartwright 
concluded that, “I am not sure whether from the human point of view, the type of 
organisation they have there is a good one, as they are driving their staff to the limit of 
human endurance.”94  
Such responses were not unusual in post-war Britain where some contemporaries 
viewed American scientific management methods as “de-humanizing”, and for much of the 
early post-war period the growth of trade unionism and full employment underpinned more 
conciliatory labour relations with many employers favouring welfare-based approaches to 
management, with an emphasis on human relations.95 At SCOW these developments 
manifested themselves in a keen level of attention to environmental factors, such as the 
appearance and cleanliness of buildings and the quality of amenities in the workplace. 
Artworks were hung in the amenity blocks, the regime of cleaning and inspection of canteen 
facilities, locker rooms and lavatories was stepped up and efforts made to enlarge 
showering and drying room facilities to keep pace with the expanding workforce. Such 
matters occupied the bulk of the business of the Abbey’s Works Council, chaired by 
Cartwright and consisting of representatives of the various trade unions with members on 
site.96 In part this was a carry-over from the inter-war period when the provision of worker 
welfare and amenities were seen as key components of labour relations and productivity,97 
but it did not seem at odds with what SCOW’s managers had observed in some of the newer 
American steelworks, where attempts had been made to create a pleasant working 
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environment. Bill Evans, for example, was impressed by the attractive landscaping of the 
Fontana works in California where he concluded that, “the horticultural adornment of the 
plant … must be in part responsible for the very excellent labour relations which exist here 
and for the general care of ‘housekeeping’ which is evident.”98 While studies of other 
employment sectors have cast doubt on the extent to which workers really cared about 
such issues,99 they were viewed by Cartwright, as vital to avoiding “labour trouble”,100 and 
came to dominate the work of the growing numbers of personnel staff which SCOW, in 
common with many other UK firms, added to the ranks of its employees in the 1950s.101 
Following their US visit, Smellie and Adamson pressed for a more professional 
approach to management, less steeped in the labour relations practices of the inter-war 
years.  To them, a more assertive approach to workforce control appeared urgent if the 
tendency to over-man and thereby limit productivity at SCOW by the mid-1950s was to be 
halted. They compared the number of bricklayers employed at Inland and SCOW to illustrate 
the extent of the problem, revealing that the Inland Company was operating twice the 
number of open hearth furnaces with fewer than half the number of bricklayers used for the 
same job in SCOW, and still achieving greater output.102 It was a situation that had been 
allowed to develop, they argued, because British managers lacked reliable information 
about what percentage of each working day was occupied by each job, and where additional 
manpower was needed. “In the British steel industry”, Smellie and Adamson observed, “no 
one has this information and can therefore exercise no real control when extra men are 
asked for.”103 What they had identified was the need for a wholesale job evaluation exercise 
as a prelude to the reorganisation of manning throughout the plant. It was a radical vision 
and, ultimately, one which proved to be almost a decade ahead of its time. The seller’s 
market in Britain in this period meant that there was a much stronger emphasis on 
maximising output than reducing manning levels. Any attempt at the latter would have 
risked undermining labour relations and upsetting the multiple trade unions.  In this 
context, Smellie and Adamson’s report made such uncomfortable reading for SCOW’s top 
hierarchy that its chairman, Sir Ernest Lever, recommended it be destroyed,104 and the size 
of the labour force continued to increase unchecked at the Abbey Works during its various 
phases of expansion in the 1950s.  
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The adverse reaction displayed at the top level of the company to Smellie and 
Adamson’s findings, demonstrated the gulf which existed in some British firms in of the 
period, between the top level of decision-makers and the plant-level managers who, in 
practice, often lacked the support and influence to implement radical change.105 Faced with 
this situation, Cartwright’s approach was pragmatic. He found other elements of Smellie and 
Adamson’s report, particularly their recommendations relating to the role of foremen, 
which were more like a continuation of initiatives already underway at SCOW to improve 
communication with the burgeoning workforce at the Abbey. The problem of how to convey 
management decisions effectively and cultivate a sense of loyalty and common purpose 
among a workforce of over 11,000 was a challenging one for managers more accustomed to 
the employment levels of Britain’s pre-war steelworks.106 In their early visits to the US, Bill 
Evans and Fred Cartwright expressed a general admiration for the way in which American 
companies seemed to be able to foster a strong sense of shared endeavour. At Kaiser 
Company’s Fontana Works Bill Evans observed, “an unmistakeable air of determination to 
get the most out of the plant, both by the staff and the men.”107 Smellie and Adamson 
attempted to delve deeper into what lay behind this culture and concluded that the “key 
man” in achieving good communications between management and shopfloor was the 
foreman. At Inland Company’s Indiana Harbour works, as well as at Fontana, Geneva, and 
the other sites they visited in 1955, they found that “the foreman is held responsible for all 
dealings with the men, all orders or information passed to them from any source, all first 
decisions on their grievances, and all disciplinary action taken, and is complete master of his 
department.” It was this, they argued, that was “probably the most vital single fact about 
successful management in America”, whereas in Britain, “the foreman position has 
weakened in the period of full employment that we have enjoyed.”108   
It had taken a decade or more of disputes, re-structuring and collective organization 
for US industrial foremen to reach this influential position.109 At SCOW the rejuvenation of 
the foreman’s role had already been identified as a means of streamlining communications 
between management and shop floor, but it proved difficult to achieve via the mechanisms 
of joint consultation, overseen by senior members of the burgeoning personnel department 
at the Abbey Works. A Foreman’s Council had been established in 1954 but attendance at 
its meetings was poor.110 Efforts to revitalise interest in it and, in particular, to spread 
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knowledge of the role of American foremen, gathered pace after the return of Smellie and 
Adamson from the US. To this end, an American speaker was engaged to address members 
of SCOW’s Foreman’s Council on “The place of foremen in US industry”.111 An initiative was 
also introduced to make foremen more distinctive and recognisable figures on the 
shopfloor, by issuing them with dust coats.112 Tellingly, even these these small measures, 
which Fred Cartwright considered to be uncontroversial, had to be negotiated carefully with 
the foremen via the works’ personnel  superintendent to whom he wrote that, “in a very 
large plant, I would have thought the identification of foremen was very important, but I 
quite realise that it is of no use pushing it through if foremen are against it. It is one of those 
things which has to come naturally or not at all.”113 The following year attempts were made 
to increase the responsibilities of foremen in their departments, particularly in relation to 
safety and accident prevention. This time the plant’s welfare manager urged tact and 
patience:  “This is, I realize, only a small step towards the appropriate imitation of American 
practices here”, he explained to Cartwright, “but I am sure that you and Mr Smellie would 
agree that we should not attempt to imitate them all at once.”114  
Such exchanges provide some insights into why American productivity messages 
proved so difficult to implement at company level. They go some way to explaining why, in 
the 1950s, SCOW’s initiatives were tentative compared to the far-reaching manpower 
review of the following decade, and certainly did not deliver any improvements in levels of 
output per man in the short term.115 The cautious approach adopted in these years fell far 
short of the urgent call for action which Smellie and Adamson had tried to convey in their 
report, but typified the non-confrontational attitude to labour relations which SCOW 
pursued throughout the 1950s as they attempted to carry their burgeoning workforce with 
them through the boom years of high demand and rapid expansion. At one level, this 
conservative approach by SCOW at the end of a decade in which they had invested so much 
time and effort in attempting to learn the secrets of the US steel industry’s success, seemed 
to point to the kind of managerial failure and lack of strategic thinking identified in studies 
of post-war British industrial management, but the full picture of SCOW’s productivity 
investigations tell a different story.  
The evidence from the Steel Company of Wales’s US visits in the late 1940s and early 
‘50s reveals a picture of a firm fully engaged with the issue of productivity, and addressing it 
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primarily through the modernization of its facilities and processes. A number of its early 
managers were highly practical, technically skilled men who excelled at finding solutions to 
the operational and design questions that they encountered as they worked to develop and 
refine a sheet steel making operation capable of satisfying the buoyant market for sheet and 
tinplate in the 1950s. For a company which had been created to build and equip a brand 
new steelworks, this pre-occupation with plant and premises was understandable. From 
1945 the Welsh-based specialists building the new steelworks at Port Talbot, went ahead 
and developed their own links with American firms as part of a thorough and personal 
immersion into the business and social cultures of leading US steel companies. Their self-
reliant and sustained commitment to the study of US productivity was designed to answer 
queries and solve production problems specific to their own operation, and evolved quite 
independently of the parallel productivity missions of the period. The detailed fact-finding 
visits by members of SCOW’s management throughout its first decade of operation made 
the company one of the best informed UK steel firms on the features of American steel 
production. One consequence of this was not only that its expertise was used by the AACP’s 
iron and steel productivity team, but also that it became the focus of modernization studies 
by other European steel firms. Throughout the 1950s the Abbey Works hosted visits by steel 
company managers from Germany, France, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands, as a wave of 
Marshall Aid-funded economic development programs rejuvenated steel production across 
Europe.116 For many of them, the Abbey works was, for a brief period, the nearest place 
where they could view up-to-date American equipment and discuss associated operational 
issues with staff in the new melting shop and strip mill.  
Thanks to their detailed scrutiny of the US steel industry from the mid-1940s 
onwards, SCOW managers were far from oblivious to the greater levels of control of pay and 
manning which were in place in the American industry.  Even at the height of the post-war 
boom, there was a growing awareness of the need to review manning structures in order to 
improve competitiveness. The fact that these ideas were not acted upon at the time was 
less a sign of complacency and more a consequence of some of the limiting effects of the 
post-war British economic climate. No matter how well informed or modernizing in outlook 
the industrial managers of the mid-1950s, their ability to implement the productivity lessons 
learned from examining US business practices was constrained by factors much closer to 
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home. Prevailing market conditions, legacies of welfare-based approaches to management 
from the inter-war period and the growth of a culture of joint consultation, combined to 
provide a check on the extent to which plant managers could push through their ideas and 
the appetite of company bosses to support them. This combination of circumstances did not 
last for long. Growing “panic” about Britain’s decline in the early 1960s did much to create a 
climate more favourable for addressing problems of labour productivity.117 At the same 
time, increased international competition created a more challenging trading environment, 
conducive to a more systematic review of job roles and manpower productivity.118 In the 
case of SCOW, the twin developments of falling demand for steel and craftworkers’ claims 
for improved holidays and pay restructuring in the early 1960s, which the company 
calculated would cost it £85,000 per annum to meet, precipitated its wide ranging 
manpower productivity review, conducted by a firm of American management consultants 
brought in by SCOW in May 1964.119  
The Steel Company of Wales, formed as a kind of flagship for the rejuvenation of the 
industry, was not a “typical” British steel firm of the post-war years.  Without additional 
studies based on the activities of other British steel companies in the same era, it is difficult 
to know how far its efforts at international knowledge gathering and its familiarity with US 
practices, were mirrored in other British firms. Yet its experience of struggling to implement 
productivity lessons learned in one economic environment to another, very different, one 
was shared by sheet steel makers elsewhere in 1950s Europe where the process was equally 
selective and “piecemeal”.120 In terms of broader patterns of knowledge acquisition and 
dissemination at work in the sector after the war, there also insights to be gained from a 
single company study. In an industry which was highly subject to centralised planning from 
the interwar period onwards,121 the SCOW case provides a useful reminder of the autonomy 
and proactivity of the individual firm when it came to learning productivity lessons from 
across the Atlantic. It also raises questions about the extent to which notions of managerial 
complacency during the post-war boom, can be applied uniformly across the steel sector. 
Evidence of SCOW’s activity ultimately provides an important counter-point to the more 
familiar story of the AACP as a disseminator of American practice in British industrial circles 
revealing a more nuanced picture in which particular business objectives and individual 
perspectives contributed to the process of steel modernization in Britain.  
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